Monetary policy analysis in a new keynesian model with money by Arístegui Lavín, María Teresa de
  
 
 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 
 
 
 
 
TRABAJO FIN DE GRADO EN 
DOBLE GRADO INTERNACIONAL 
ADE Y ECONOMÍA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MONETARY POLICY ANALYSIS IN A NEW KEYNESIAN 
MODEL WITH MONEY 
 
 
Módulo: Análisis Económico 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Teresa de Arístegui  
Miguel Casares 
 
 
 
 
Pamplona-Iruña, 13 de Mayo de 2019 
 
Monetary Policy Analysis in a New Keynesian Model with Money.            
   
  
 2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the stabilizing performance of two alternative monetary policy rules, 
being the first one based on the nominal interest rate and the second one on the rate of 
nominal money growth. The analysis is based on a calibrated New Keynesian model with 
money. The model includes several features such as a transaction cost technology, sticky 
prices and a monopolistic competitive industry. The methodology entails an analysis of the 
performance of two monetary policy regimes, where we evaluate social welfare from the 
expected household intertemporal utility. We seek for the optimized coefficient on the 
response of the policy instrument to inflation deviations and compare the results between 
the policy rules as well as with the baseline calibration. The results obtained show that the 
optimized Taylor rule is obtained with a coefficient on inflation equal to 4, which 
outperforms the original Taylor (1993) rule coefficient of 1.5. In a nominal money growth 
rule, the optimized coefficient on inflation is significantly higher (around 11) and the social 
welfare obtained is slightly lower than in the case of an interest-rate rule. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The New Keynesian (NK) Model emerged a few decades ago in the US during the post-war 
period with the intention of examining some micro and macro foundations that other models 
did not truly cover (Rotenberg and Woodford, 1996; King and Wolman, 1996). Since then, 
it has been dominant in macroeconomics, all in classrooms, academic research and in policy 
modeling. It combines some aspects of the Real Business Cycle Theory with others derived 
from Keynesian economics. The latter focuses on the total spending of an economy, and the 
implications of this on output and inflation. The followers of this theory placed heavy 
emphasis on the concept of full employment, as well as on sporadic & indirect state 
intervention, while New-Keynesians rather focused on economic growth and stability, 
insisting on the fact that the market is not self-regulating. Some of its most characteristic (as 
well as commonly criticized) factors include: the assumptions of rational expectations, 
monopolistic competition, and an infinitely-lived representative household.  
The Neo-Keynesians extended Keynes’s propositions to dynamic growth and business cycle 
models. In addition, this model includes rational expectations. The development of such 
theory significantly modified the dynamic macroeconomics. On the one hand, there are some 
economic variables, that are indeed influenced by previous years. On the other hand, though, 
there are others that are related to the future through the agents’ expectations on the future 
of such or other variables: for instance, this month’s consumption will not only depend on 
our monthly income, but also on the income we expect to receive in the following months, 
and so on. This is also the case of financial variables such as interest rate, which is closely 
dependent on future expectations.  
There is a first discrepancy between New Classical and New Keynesian economists, that lies 
on how quickly wages and prices adjust. The first assume that prices and wages are flexible, 
which permits the clearing of the market. The second, however, believe in a model with 
sticky wages and prices, rather than flexible. They place a big importance on monetary policy, 
which, they believe, strongly influences the economic activity.  
This New Keynesian model identifies various actors in the economy, who interact and 
exchange goods and services in order to maximize their own wellbeing. These are the 
households, firms, and government (state). In this study, we will define them individually, 
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citing commonly stablished macroeconomic terms and relations with the aim of constructing 
the model that will serve as a basis of our monetary policy analysis. Moreover, we will define 
and explain the role of the Central Bank under these specifications. Therefore, this paper will 
first review the New Keynesian Macroeconomic model and then simulate the 
implementation of a monetary shock (monetary policy) which will be followed by an analysis 
of the resulting situation. The basic New Keynesian model that we will lay out below (and 
which is laid out in Woodford (2003) and Gali (2007)) has no investment or capital. This 
simplifies the analysis quite a bit and permits us to get better intuition.  
The model here presented includes money, which is perceived by individuals as a medium 
of exchange that allows them to consume, exchange and trade their resources (labor time) 
for others (goods or services). Moreover, individuals’ utility does not include their leisure 
utility, but their labor disutility, in order for the time allocation and model to be simpler.  
Another important aspect that the model of this paper exhibits is the habit persistence. Put 
another way, consumers’ utility depends on past consumption. Tus, the marginal utility of 
consumption depends on past consumption. 
Prices, which will be described and presented in next sections, are derived with rigidities a la 
Calvo (1983): there is a constant probability that the price cannot be reset optimally by a single 
firm. In this case, prices are updated by applying an indexation rule based on lagged inflation. 
New Keynesian DSGE models generally use a Taylor-rule monetary policy. In this paper, 
we will aim to compare that regime to a money-growth rule, in order to assess their validity.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A Monetary policy is a set of actions through which the monetary authority determines the 
conditions under which it supplies the money that circulates in the economy. Most studies 
confirm that over the medium term there is an extremely high correlation between the 
growth rate of the money supply and the inflation rate (McCandless and Webert, 1995). 
However, when authors address the short term, their conclusions differ vastly. On the one 
hand, some of them support the idea that an increase in the money supply cannot affect real 
wages or economic growth (Chaitip et al.,2015) . Put another way, money is deemed neutral 
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in the short and in the medium-long run. On the other hand, economists in the new 
Keynesian school believe in the power of money as a tool to promote economic growth 
(Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000). They support that money is far from being neutral, at 
least in the short run. 
Many authors have focused their studies on the effect of monetary policies on the economy, 
following different models and specifications. Money is a known medium of exchange, that 
permits and facilitates transactions. Thus, individuals do not necessarily get higher utility 
when holding money per se. Individuals get utility from correctly using that money in buying 
goods (or services). If we stop and think about it, goods do not buy other goods, so the 
actual value of money is no other than giving individuals the opportunity of yielding utility 
through the purchase of goods. Clower (1967) emphasized the important value of a medium 
of exchange that helps the process of transacting. This was first presented by Baumol (1952) 
and Tobin (1956). 
The main problem faced by the individual is the balance between the opportunity cost of 
holding money, against the value of leisure. Thus, consumers need to decide how they will 
combine both time and money to purchase consumption goods. The relationship between 
money holdings, time and leisure is the following; the higher the money holdings an 
individual owns, the lower the time needed for shopping, which leads to enjoying higher 
leisure time. The idea of transaction costs function arose with Niehans (1978) and is now 
included in the main economic models. We will also include it in the model used in this 
paper. 
The ability of central banks to achieve a high degree of credibility with the public for their 
policy commitments ought to be greater in an era of price stability (Woodford, 1999). Such 
an era, we could presume, would be one in which the goals of macroeconomic stabilization 
policy were reasonably well achieved, so that there would be no need for dramatic policy 
experiments. Moreover, the public will come to understand the objectives of the central bank 
under this scenario.   
Yun (1996) studied the ability of nominal price rigidity to explain the movement of inflation 
under a standard real business cycle model using post-war US data. Others, such as Erceg, 
Henderson and Levin (2000) sought to find the optimal monetary policy, in an economy 
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where both labor and product markets exhibit monopolistic competition and staggered 
nominal contracts. Most of them used Calvo (1983) sticky price specifications, as well as 
Taylor (1993) monetary policy rule.  
Therefore, taking the aforementioned studies into account as well as commonly believed 
macroeconomic theory, our objective is to analyze the extent of the impact of monetary 
policy on economic stability under sticky prices. In order to address this question, this paper 
introduces the extension of the New Keynesian model into a DSGE model that is estimated 
with Bayesian econometric techniques (Smets and Wouters, 2003 for the Euro Area and 
2007, for the US). Section 4 of the paper will attempt to give reasonable calibration to the 
parameters in the model. The main analysis will evaluate the performance of two alternative 
monetary policy rules to check their effectiveness. The last section concludes by summarizing 
key results and highlighting their implications.  
3. THE MODEL 
3.1. Households. 
Household Preferences 
Macroeconomic models generally use a representative household to depict their behavior in 
the economy. This representative figure consumes goods, supplies labor, accumulates bonds, 
holds shares in firms, and accumulates money. It gets utility from effectively allocating 
consumption and leisure time. However, since we do not regard the individuals’ leisure time, 
we will focus on their labor disutility rather than their leisure utility. The household has 
rational expectations and its utility maximization problem includes three main components. 
First, we define the household preferences, commonly addressed as utility function, where t 
stands for units of time: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 →
(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1
𝐴 )1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
−  Ψ
𝑛𝑡
1+γ
1 + γ
 
This function, household preferences in period t, is composed of two parts: consumption 
utility and labor disutility. These arguments are a consumption index, 𝑐𝑡, and labor hours, 
𝑛𝑡 . On the one hand, Consumption utility accounts for the positive impact of consumption 
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on one’s utility. The household gets utility from increasing consumption with respect to 
external consumption habits, thus, aggregate lagged consumption (𝑐𝑡−1
𝐴 ), being ℎ the 
consumption habits parameter, which relates both consumption patterns (present and 
aggregate), which is a value between 0 and 1. The risk aversion parameter 𝜎 is greater than 
0, for decreasing marginal utility of consumption.  Labor disutility, on the other hand, shows 
the negative impact of time spent at work rather than at leisure activities. Thus, we can infer 
the relationship between both household decisions (consumption and labor supply) and the 
household’s utility, it being positive and negative, respectively. Households are both 
consumers and service (labor) suppliers. They buy consumption goods at given prices in the 
markets and sell their time to the firms (labor) in exchange for income. The income they 
receive is allocated between purchasing consumption goods, investment goods and 
government bonds. 
The objective function of the representative household in period t is, therefore: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥.  ∑𝐸𝑡𝛽
𝑗 [
(𝑐𝑡+𝑗 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1+𝑗
𝐴 )
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡
1+γ
1 + γ
]
∞
𝑗=0
 
Subject to the budget constraint 
In period t, the household chooses bt+1, ct, mt and nt to maximize the expected utility. Here, 
we introduce rational expectations, as we believe that households will use all the available 
information to take into account what the future holds. Put another way, their outcome 
somewhat depends on what households expect to happen (Muth,1961). As we can observe, 
the function to maximize includes the rational expectation operator (𝐸𝑡), followed by a 
discount factor of period j+1, 𝛽, which is a number lower than 1, as it represents the rate of 
intertemporal preference. This discount factor is in fact 𝛽=1/(1+𝜌), where 𝜌 > 0 is the 
discount rate. In equilibrium, 𝜌 equals the market real interest rate. It is thought that ‘𝜌’ is a 
measure of substitutability (Dingel, 2009).  
Budget Constraint 
Second, we introduce the household budget constrain in nominal terms that limits the 
optimizing program of the representative household in period t: 
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𝐷𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡𝑛𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + (1 + 𝑅𝑡)
−1𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 − 𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝐻𝑡  
From the equation we can infer the following: the amount destined to consumption and 
portfolio allocation cannot exceed the budget of the household, which is the labor income, 
net of taxes (𝑊𝑡𝑛𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡), where 𝑊𝑡is the nominal wage, 𝑛𝑡 is the labor supplied by the 
individual and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑡represents the taxes paid,  plus the dividends obtained from the holdings 
of monopolistically competitive firms (𝐷𝑡). This amount should cover the household’s 
consumption (𝐶𝑡) at a price 𝑃𝑡 , the net purchases of government bonds (which is represented 
by (1 + 𝑅𝑡)
−1𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡), with a nominal interest rate 𝑅𝑡, the increase of money holdings, 
𝑀𝑡 − 𝑀𝑡−1 and the transaction costs, 𝐻𝑡. If we now divide the nominal budget constraint by 
𝑃𝑡 (aggregate price level), we obtain the budget constraint faced by the representative 
household in real terms. 
𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡–  𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡  + 𝑑𝑡  =  𝑐𝑡  +  (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑏𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡  – (1 + 𝜋𝑡)
−1𝑚𝑡−1  +  ℎ𝑡 
In each period t=0,1,2, ..., the representative household possesses mt-1 real units of money 
and bt-1 real units of bonds, issued in period t-1, and maturity in period t. In addition, rt is 
the real interest rate on bonds, and bt+1 is the amount of government bonds that the 
household purchases in period t, which will be reimbursed in period t+1.Then, the 
household brings to period t+1 mt units of money. Finally, 𝜋𝑡 is the rate of inflation in period 
t, which can be understood as 𝜋𝑡 = (Pt/Pt-1)-1.  
Transactions technology. 
Finally, we consider the transactions technology, that provides the transaction costs ℎ𝑡 , 
depending on the level of consumption, 𝑐𝑡 and the amount of real money holdings, 𝑚𝑡. This 
function shows that households not only devote money to carrying out consumption 
activities, but also time. Therefore, intuitively, the transaction cost function ℎ𝑡 = ℎ(𝑐𝑡 ,𝑚𝑡) 
increases with consumption and decreases with money holdings. This can be accounted for 
by the fact that holding money facilitates consumption, and it prevents from incurring in 
transaction costs (time, selling something in exchange of money, taking out a loan or bank 
credit…).  
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From the transaction cost function, we can obtain the partial derivatives with respect to 𝑚𝑡 
and 𝑐𝑡 , which reflects the relationships between these variables and transaction costs (Proof 
is available upon request) The first derivative of transaction costs with respect to money 
(
𝜕ℎ(𝑐𝑡,𝑚𝑡)
𝜕𝑚𝑡
) is negative, which indicates that having money in hand prevents households from 
increasing the total and marginal transaction costs. Conversely, the relationship between 
consumption and transaction costs (
𝜕ℎ(𝑐𝑡,𝑚𝑡)
𝜕𝑐𝑡
) is positive, since higher consumption entails 
higher costs in terms of time, product search, availability of resources that permit the 
purchase etc. Finally, the crossed derivative (
𝜕ℎ(𝑐𝑡,𝑚𝑡)
𝜕𝑚𝑡𝜕𝑐𝑡
) is negative, meaning that an increase 
in real money would reduce the marginal transaction cost of consumption.  
Representative Household Optimizing Program 
In period t, the representative household seeks to maximize her utility by solving this 
optimizing program: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥. 𝐸𝑡  ∑𝛽
𝑗 [
𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝑗(𝑐𝑡+𝑗 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1+𝑗
𝐴 )
1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
− Ψ
𝑛𝑡
1+γ
1 + γ
]
∞
𝑗=0
 
Where 𝑒𝑏𝑡+𝑗 is an exogenous consumption preference shock. The utility function is subject 
to: 
𝑤𝑡+𝑗𝑛𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑑𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑐𝑡+𝑗 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑗)
−1
𝑏𝑡+1+𝑗 + 𝑏𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑚𝑡+𝑗 + (1 +
𝜋𝑡+𝑗)
−1
𝑚𝑡−1+𝑗 − ℎ(𝑐𝑡+𝑗, 𝑚𝑡+𝑗) = 0      For j=0,1,2,…  
Therefore, we can observe that the households’ utility depends on consumption and labor 
time. We just learnt that increasing money holdings has a positive impact on the household’s 
utility: having money in hand reduces time spent shopping, which leaves more time for 
leisure, thus increasing utility.  
The maximization program first order conditions with respect to consumption lead to 
obtaining the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.  
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𝜆𝑡 = 
(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1
𝐴 )−𝜎
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
, 
which represents the shadow value of one unit of income. As the marginal utility of 
consumption divided by the marginal cost of purchasing consumption goods. The first-
order-condition of bonds bt+1, can be used to substitute the Lagrange multiplier obtained 
before and get the following consumption Euler equation: 
(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1)
−𝜎
(1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡)(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
= 𝛽 
𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑐𝑡)
1 + 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑡+1
     
From here, we can obtain the first equation of our model. The marginal benefit of current 
consumption equals the discounted expected marginal benefit of future consumption. That 
is, 𝛽 represents the weight the household assigns to the future. In a similar way, the labor 
supply function derived from the corresponding first-order-condition is the following:  
𝜆𝑡𝑤𝑡 =  Ψnt
γ
 
This shows that the marginal benefit of “one unit of work” (left-hand-side of the equation) 
equals the marginal utility loss on “one unit of work” (right-hand-side). Following the same 
procedure as before, we substitute the first Lagrange multiplier into the first-order condition 
of 𝑛𝑡 , and obtain the following: 
(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1)
−𝜎
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
𝑤𝑡 =  Ψnt
γ, 
Where solving for labor supply: 
𝑛𝑡 = [
1
Ψ
(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1)
−𝜎
1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡
𝑤𝑡]
1
γ
 
Finally, we derive the next equation in the model from combining the first order condition 
of real money (𝑚𝑡) and that of bonds (𝑏𝑡+1).  
−ℎ𝑚𝑡 = 
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
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From this third relationship we learn that the marginal benefit of one unit of money (which 
saves transaction costs when purchasing consumption goods) equals the marginal 
opportunity cost (instead of holding one unit of money, the household could hold bonds 
and make an interest return equal to 𝑅𝑡. This equation represents the general transaction cost 
function, but, as stated before, this function can be specified into the following: 
ℎ(𝑐𝑡,𝑚𝑡) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝑡 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
𝑎2
, where 𝑎0 , 𝑎1 > 0  and  𝑎2 > 1 
Then, we can obtain the partial derivatives of the transaction cost function ℎ𝑡 = ℎ(𝑐𝑡,𝑚𝑡) 
with respect to both consumption and real money holdings: 
ℎ𝑐𝑡 = 
𝜕ℎ(𝑐𝑡, 𝑚𝑡)
𝜕𝑐𝑡
= 𝑎1 (1 + 𝑎2) (
𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
𝑎2
 
ℎ𝑚𝑡 = 
𝜕ℎ(𝑐𝑡, 𝑚𝑡)
𝜕𝑚𝑡
= −𝑎1𝑎2 (
𝐶𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
1+𝑎2
 
which we can combine to obtain the specific money demand function as follows: 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 [
𝑎1𝑎2
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
⁄
]
(1 1+𝑎2⁄
)
 
 Up to this point we have 7 equations and 7 variables that constitute the household’s 
model we will use in this study. The variables are: 𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡, ℎ𝑡 , ℎ𝑐𝑡, ℎ𝑚𝑡, 𝑦𝑡.  
3.2. Firms. 
Firms produce a differentiated consumption good that is sold in a monopolistically 
competitive industry as first described by Dixit and Stiglitz (1997). The representative firm 
maximization problem is subject to three constraints. The first constraint (1) is the 
production function: 
𝑦𝑡(𝑖)  =  𝑒
𝑧𝑡  𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼(𝑖)                                   (1) 
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The production of firm i expressed in equation (1) entails that there is no capital 
accumulation or stock of capital considered, just as mention in the introduction.  Each firm-
specific labor demand, 𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼(𝑖), represents the level that permits firm i to obtain the firm-
specific output, 𝑦𝑡(𝑖). The second constraint (2) is the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) demand curve 
faced by each firm: 
𝑦𝑡(𝑖) = (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜃
𝑦𝑡                                          (2) 
This function corresponds to the optimal substitution across differentiated consumption 
goods in a monopolistic competition market. Finally, the third constraint is that each period 
some firms are not able to adjust their price. Thus, each firm sets the price of the good it 
produces, but not all firms reset their price in each period. 
Price stickiness, thus, arises when setting the selling price, and we are going to use the model 
presented by Calvo (1983) in order to better explain this stickiness scheme. Many papers use 
the Calvo specification in the New Keynesian Models. Some examples are Yun (1996), Erceg, 
Henderson and Levin (2000), and Casares (2007), among others.  In order to get price-
stickiness in the model, we must have firms as price-setters, which means we need to move 
away from the perfectly competitive benchmark. Calvo (1983) assumed that firms adjust their 
prices infrequently and that opportunities to adjust arrive with constant probability. Each 
new period, thus, there is a constant probability (1- η) that the firm can and will adjust its 
price. There is an expected time between adjustments of about 1/(1- η). The main 
explanation for this is that not every firm can adjust prices at the same time. The adjustment 
of prices is indeed staggered, which complicates the price changes, as firms are not indifferent 
to the prices charged by their competitors. Thus, taking η as the Calvo probability, we find 
two types of firms in the model: those who do not get to adjust prices, represented by η, and 
those who get to adjust prices, represented by (1 − η). On the one hand, those firms that 
cannot adjust prices, rather than leaving them unchanged (and thus, 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃𝑡−1(𝑖)), the 
price is automatically adjusted by applying an indexation factor as follows,  
𝑃𝑡(𝑖) =  [(1 + 𝜋𝑡−1)
𝜅𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)
1−𝜅𝑝]𝑃𝑡−1(𝑖), 
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being [(1 + 𝜋𝑡−1)
𝜅𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)
1−𝜅𝑝] the indexation factor, where 𝑣𝑡 = 𝜌𝑡𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑣  is 
an AR(1) process with white-noise innovations, 𝜀𝑡
𝑣~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2).  In the equation, 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) is the 
optimal selling price during period t.  
On the other hand, if firm i can set the optimal price in period t, the price will be set at the 
value that maximizes the intertemporal profit function: 
𝐸𝑡 ∑𝛽
𝑗ηj (
(1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡+𝑗)𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡+𝑗
)
∞
𝑗=0
1− 𝜃
𝑦𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑤𝑡+𝑗𝑛𝑡+𝑗(𝑖) 
Subject to the production function and the Dixit-Stiglitz demand constraints. Following 
Walsh (2017), the first order condition on 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) results in the following optimal price: 
𝑃𝑡(𝑖) =  
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
[
 
 
 
 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑗ηj𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑗(𝑖) (
𝑃𝑡+𝑗
1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡+𝑗
)
𝜃
𝑦𝑡+𝑗
∞
𝑗=0
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑗ηj (
𝑃𝑡+𝑗
1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡+𝑗
)
𝜃−1
𝑦𝑡+𝑗
∞
𝑗=0 ]
 
 
 
 
 
where (1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡+𝑗) is the indexation factor described above and 𝑚𝑐𝑡+𝑗 is the real marginal 
cost. When trying to set their prices, then, firms need to pick a price 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) that allows them 
to maximize the expected profit considering the costs they incur. The following auxiliary 
variables were first introduced by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), and they are generally 
used to obtain the equations for the inflation dynamics: 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡𝑚𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽η𝐸𝑡 [𝐴𝑡+1 (
(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1)
(1 + 𝜋𝑡)𝑘𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)1−𝑘𝑝
)
𝜃
1−α 
] 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽η𝐸𝑡 [𝐵𝑡+1 (
(1+𝜋𝑡+1)
(1+𝜋𝑡)𝑘𝑝(1+𝜋+𝑣𝑡)1−𝑘𝑝
)
𝜃−1
] 
Which allows us to express the relative price function in the following way: 
[
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
]
1+
𝜃α
1−α
𝐵𝑡 = 
𝜃
𝜃 − 1
𝐴𝑡 
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At the same time, the Dixit-Stiglitz price aggregation shows: 
[𝑃𝑡]
1−𝜃 = (1 − η) + η [(1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡)
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
]
1−𝜃
, 
Which, by using  1 + 𝜋𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
 as well as the price indexation factor in period t, 
(1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡) = (1 + 𝜋𝑡−1)
𝜅𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)
1−𝜅𝑝, leads to obtaining the following and 
equivalent expression: 
[
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
]
𝜃−1
= (1 − η) + η[(1 + 𝜋𝑡−1)
𝜅𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)
1−𝜅𝑝]1−𝜃 [(1 + 𝜋𝑡)
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
]
𝜃−1
 
These last four derived equations comprise the Inflation dynamics block, for given values of 
𝑦𝑡and 𝑐𝑡. 
Finally, it is important to note that the monopolistically competitive firms we are describing 
are owned by the households, who, in turn, receive dividends. The aggregate real dividend, 
𝑑𝑡 (which appeared in the households’ budget constraint) can be obtained as follows: 
𝑑𝑡 = ∫
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
1
0
𝑦(𝑖)𝑑𝑖 − ∫ 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡(𝑖)𝑑𝑖 = 
1
0
∫
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
(
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜃1
0
𝑦𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡 ∫ 𝑛𝑡(𝑖)𝑑𝑖 
1
0
 
where we can distinguish the Dixit-Stiglitz Demand Constraint, 𝑦𝑡(𝑖) = (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
−𝜃
𝑦𝑡. 
Inserting aggregate labor ∫ 𝑛𝑡(𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
 and taking 𝑦𝑡 out of the integral gives: 
𝑑𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 ∫ (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
𝑑𝑖 − 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡
1
0
 
where we can introduce 𝑃𝐷𝑡 = ∫ (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
𝑑𝑖
1
0
 as the price dispersion indicator1 (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2005), which corresponds to the sum of all firms (those who set the 
                                                 
1 1 Using  the price dispersion indicator definition proposed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005): 
 𝑃𝐷𝑡 ≡ ∫ (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
𝑑𝑖
1
0
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optimal price in period t plus those who did it in t-1, plus those who did it in t-2…and so 
on). 
𝑃𝐷𝑡 = (1 − η) (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
+ η[(1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡)]
1−𝜃𝑃𝐷𝑡−1. 
 
Output Gap 
It is usual to find in the New Keynesian literature the concept of output gap. This term is 
generally defined as the fractional deviation of current output from the flexible-price level of 
output (see Woodford, 2003). Thus, under these circumstances, all prices can be adjusted by 
all agents of the economy.  
𝑦?̃? = 
𝑦𝑡
𝑦?̅?
− 1 
Where 𝑦?̃? represents the output gap in period t and the term ?̅?𝑡 is the flexible-price level of 
output (also known as potential output or natural-rate level of output). If we use the Calvo 
probability, η, this scenario of flexible prices would be represented by η =0. This situation 
implies that prices are fully-flexible to adjust optimally every period. Thus, all firms are able 
to attain the optimal price, which is the same for all of them. The results are the following: 
first, the mark-up of prices over the marginal costs is constant, and represented by 𝑚𝑐𝑡 =
 
𝜃−1
𝜃
 and second, the real marginal costs show no fluctuations since real wage is a fraction of 
the marginal product of labor: 
𝑤𝑡̅̅ ̅
𝑓?̅?𝑡
=
𝜃 − 1
𝜃
,  
Where 𝑓?̅?𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑧𝑡(1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑡
−𝛼 , which represents the labor function. Not only this is true, 
but at the same time, households supply the level of labor that makes the marginal rate of 
substitution between hours (including transaction costs) and consumption equal to the real 
wage, which is observed in the following:  
𝑤𝑡̅̅ ̅̂ =  
(1 + ℎ𝑐?̅?)
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐?̅? − ℎ𝑐?̅?)
−𝜎 ψ(𝑛𝑡̅̅̅)
𝛾  
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The production under flexible-prices and natural-rate labor, taking into consideration that 
we ignore capital accumulation and the stock of capital,  is the following: 
?̅?𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑧𝑡?̅?𝑡
1−𝛼 
Thus, from the first equation, we can rewrite: 
?̅?𝑡 = 
𝜓?̅?𝑡
𝛼(1 + ℎ𝑐?̅?)
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐?̅? − ℎ𝑐?̅?−1)−𝜎
 
Moreover, potential income equals potential private consumption plus public spending 
(adjusted for an external shock, 𝑒𝑏𝑡), just as follows: 
?̅?𝑡 = 𝑐?̅? + 𝑔𝑡 + ℎ̅𝑡 
where 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜒𝑡 and 𝜒𝑡 is an AR(1) process described as follows: 𝜒𝑡 = 𝜌𝜒𝜒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝜒
, being 
𝜀𝑡
𝜒
~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀𝑥
2 ). Since we include 𝑐?̅? we need to find an equation that includes it, which is the 
partial derivative of the transaction costs with respect to consumption goods,  
ℎ𝑐?̅? = 𝑎1(1 + 𝑎2) (
𝑐?̅?
?̅?𝑡
)
𝑎2
 
The same happens with ?̅?𝑡, for which we derive the partial derivative of transaction cost 
with respect to potential real money, and get: 
𝑎1𝑎2 (
𝑐?̅?
?̅?𝑡
)
1+𝑎2
= 
?̅?𝑡
1 + ?̅?𝑡
 
In order to include the last variable, ?̅?, we use the Fisher relation, which relates both real and 
nominal interest rates, through inflation: 
1 + ?̅?𝑡 = 
1 + ?̅?𝑡
1 + 𝐸𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
 
The next equation to consider is the Euler condition, that includes the real interest rate ?̅?𝑡:  
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐?̅? − ℎ𝑐?̅?−1)
−𝜎
(1 + ℎ𝑐?̅?)(1 + ?̅?𝑡)
=  𝛽𝐸𝑡 [
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐?̅?+1 − ℎ𝑐?̅?)
−𝜎
(1 + ℎ𝑐?̅?+1)
] 
 
The Euler equation essentially implies that the household must be indifferent between 
consuming one more unit today, on the one hand, and saving that unit and consuming in the 
Monetary Policy Analysis in a New Keynesian Model with Money.            
   
  
 18 
future on the other. If the household chooses to consume today, he gets the marginal utility 
of consumption today — the left-hand side of the equation, put another way, he gets the 
utility of today’s consumption. If, instead, the household saves that unit, he gets to consume 
1+R units in the future, each giving him extra units of utility. Because this utility comes in 
the future, it is discounted by the discounting factor 𝛽. That is the right side of the Euler 
equation. The fact that these two sides must be equal is what guarantees that the household 
will be indifferent between consuming today versus in the future (Jones, 2009).  
Finally, we reference the transaction cost function, ℎ𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑚𝑡), as follows,  
ℎ𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑚𝑡) = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝑡 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
𝑎2
, 
with which we complete the set of equations necessary to solve the potential (or natural-rate) 
level of output (?̂?). Thus, we have 10 new variables : ?̅?𝑡, ?̅?𝑡 , ?̅?𝑡, 𝑐?̅?, ℎ𝑐?̅?, ?̅?𝑡, ?̅?𝑡, ?̅?𝑡 , ?̅?𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ?̅? ,  
which we solve through the 10-equation system we just presented.  
This system we presented follows the New Keynesian optimization scheme, a model with 
money and sticky prices. Applying Calvo (1983) pricing specifications, the rigidity of prices 
depends on the value of the η probability. Literature reveals that the usual calibration of this 
probability lies between 0.66< η <0.75. Hence, if η = 0.75 (Lhuissier and Zabelina, 2014) 
and if one period equals one quarter, then the average (or expected) lifetime of a nominal 
price chosen today is equal to: (1/1 −  𝜂) = (1/1 − 0.75) = 4 quarters = 1 year. Put 
another way, 𝜂 =  0.75 implies that on average prices remain constant (unchanged) for one 
year. 
3.3. Government and Central Bank 
The next agent contemplated in the economy is the Government. This agent acts as the 
representative of the general public. Along the years, there have been differing schools of 
thought on the role of the government in a country’s economy. The classical economists, 
such as Adam Smith, Say and others, advocated the doctrine of non-intervention of the 
government in economic matters, commonly known as “laissez faire”. Adam Smith was the 
first one to introduce the concept of the “invisible hand”, which accounts for the free 
functioning of the price (market) system in the absence of government intervention. These 
classical economists believe that a self-regulating economy is the most effective system, since 
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individuals will allocate the available resources in the most efficient manner in order to meet 
their needs and those of the firms.  
The Great Depression forced to implement a different approach in the market, referred to 
as the “visible hand” of the government. The existence of imperfection in the markets 
(imperfect information, imperfect competition...) forces the state to take part in the correct 
development of the country’s economy. Thus, it seems obvious that the government should 
intervene in economic affairs, given that the market mechanism is imperfect. Therefore, 
Keynesians deem the government as an essential figure that helps the economy succeed. 
They place great important on both the private and public sectors, who influence the 
economic activity. In fact, they believe government spending is the best economic stimulator, 
since they believe that it could even replace private spending on both goods and services or 
business investments. 
For all the reasons above mentioned, we include the government in the model, as we believe 
it has four main functions in the economy. However, the role of the government (and thus, 
its fiscal policy) is secondary in our model. It will just comply with the budget constraint. 
The government budget constraint introduces three ways to raise public revenue. The first 
one is through taxes (𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡); the government can require their citizens to pay some income 
to finance public spending. The second source of income is through borrowing. In this case, 
governments request an amount of funds and issue bonds with a promise to repay the funds 
with some amount of interest. , which in real terms is (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑏𝑡 .  Households 
will purchase these bonds, helping the government to raise the income it needs while getting 
some interest in return. Finally, the third option the government has is printing new money, 
which in real terms is expressed as 𝑚𝑡 − (1 + п𝑡)
−1𝑚𝑡−1. If we put this as an equation, we 
have: 
𝑔𝑡  =  𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡+1– 𝑏𝑡  +  𝑚𝑡 –  (1 + + п𝑡)
−1𝑚𝑡−1 
 
Overall Budget Constraint. 
Since there is no capital accumulation in our model, consequently, no investment is 
considered; plus, the overall budget constraint is obtained by combining both the households 
(private) and government (public) income and spending. Remember that: 
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Households Budget Constraint: 
𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡  + 𝑑𝑡  –  𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡+1 – 𝑏𝑡  + 𝑚𝑡  – (1 + п𝑡)
−1 𝑚𝑡−1 +  ℎ(𝑐𝑡 ,𝑚𝑡) 
Government Budget Constraint: 
𝑔𝑡 =  𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡  +  (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1𝑏𝑡−1 – 𝑏𝑡  +  𝑚𝑡 – (1 + п𝑡)
−1 𝑚𝑡−1 
The resulting equation is the overall budget constraint, which shows that total income (public 
and private) equals total spending (public and private) plus any transaction costs incurred: 
𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡  + 𝑑𝑡  =  𝑐𝑡  +  𝑔𝑡  +  ℎ(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡), 
Where the left part represents total income (𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡  +  𝑑𝑡), and the right-hand side represents 
total spending (𝑐𝑡  +  𝑔𝑡) plus transaction costs ℎ(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑚𝑡).  
Finally, we will describe the behavior of the central bank. Central banks are independent 
national institutions that provide financial and banking services. The main role of a central 
bank is to conduct monetary policy to achieve price stability (low and stable inflation, 
generally around 2%) and to help manage economic fluctuations. 
Monetary policy analysis implies testing the performance of alternative monetary policy rules 
applied to the economies. Monetary policy functions as follows: an increase in money supply 
(i.e. an expansionary monetary policy) stimulates the economic activity, whereas a decrease 
in money supply (i.e. a contractionary monetary policy) slows down the economy. Central 
banks usually have three main tools of monetary control: (1) open-market operations, with 
which they buy and sell government bonds in the open market, (2) the interest rate and (3) 
reserve requirements for commercial banks. The latter, (2) and (3), define the conditions at 
which commercial banks can borrow money from the central banks. 
However, even though central banks’ role is very important, they can only have indirect 
control of the overall money supply. Commercial banks also lend money, even more than 
they hold, thus increasing the existing money supply. Even though these banks also influence 
the economy, some believe that central banks have never been more powerful as they are 
today (Richard Layard, 2005). Monetary policy has become the main instrument of 
macroeconomic stability, and in a growing number of countries monetary policy is in the 
hands of independent central banks. They hold the monopoly on issuing money. Since 
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money plays a great role in every country’s economy, the significant role of central banks 
arises accordingly. 
Monetary policy decisions affect expectations for the future performance of the economy 
and, in particular, of prices. Economic agents determine their prices based on these 
expectations. Woodford (1999) contemplated the fact that when the private sector is 
forward-looking, and perceive the central bank's commitments as credible, commitments 
regarding future policy indeed affect the short-run constraints, only when these are able to 
affect the expectations that determine private behavior in the present.  
Thus, since monetary authorities are to follow a monetary policy rule either on the nominal 
interest rate instrument or on a money-growth instrument, our model will try to evaluate 
which instrument is more appropriate. We will follow a Taylor-type monetary rule as follows: 
1 + 𝑅𝑡 = ((1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
1−𝜇𝜋)
1−𝜇𝑅(1 + 𝑅𝑡−1)
𝜇𝜋(1 + 𝜋𝑡)
(1−𝜇𝑅)𝜇𝜋(1 + 𝑦?̃?)
(1−𝜇𝑅)𝜇𝑦𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑅
 
where 𝑦?̃? is the output gap, and 𝜀𝑡
𝑅 is a white-noise policy shock. Moreover, 𝜇𝜋 > 1, 0 < 𝜇𝑅 <
1, and 𝜇𝑦 > 0 are the Taylor Rule coefficients on inflation, output gap and interest-rate 
smoothing, respectively. The money growth monetary rule applied will be of the type: 
1 + 𝑔𝑀𝑡 = (
𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡−1
) (1 + 𝜋) 
 
3.4 Equations of the New Keynesian model with money.  
The model we just presented includes a total of 36 equations2, and 36 endogenous variables, 
respectively. These are: 𝑦, ?̅?, 𝑐, 𝑐̅, 𝑛, ?̅?, R, r, ?̅?, w, ?̅?, 𝜋, mc, 𝑓n, 𝑑𝑦, ?̃?, 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑃, 𝑃𝐷, 𝑚, ℎ, 
ℎ𝑐 , ?̅?, ℎ̅, ℎ𝑐̅̅ ̅, ?̅?, ?̅?, gM, 𝑢𝑡
𝑐, 𝑢𝑡
𝑛, 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑡 z, v, 𝜒, and b. There are as well some exogenous 
variables: 𝑒𝑧𝑡, 𝜀𝑣, 𝜀𝑏, 𝜀𝑅 and 𝜀𝜒. Finally, the parameters we use are: 𝛽, 𝜎, 𝛼, ℎ, 𝜓, 𝑔𝑦, 𝛾, 𝜃, 
η, 𝑘𝑝, 𝜇𝜋, 𝜇𝑦, 𝜇𝑅, 𝜋, 𝑎0,  𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝜌𝑧, 𝜌𝑣 , 𝜌𝜒 and 𝜌𝑏; The corresponding equations described 
and derived along this paper correspond to: 
The Inflation Block. 
                                                 
2 There are 33 equations described in this section; the 3 remaining equations will be derived in the 
following section, together with the corresponding variable definitions.  
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𝐴𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡𝑚𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽η𝐸𝑡 [𝐴𝑡+1 (
(1 + 𝜋𝑡+1)
(1 + 𝜋𝑡)𝑘𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)1−𝑘𝑝
)
𝜃
1−α 
] 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽η𝐸𝑡 [𝐵𝑡+1 (
(1+𝜋𝑡+1)
(1+𝜋𝑡)𝑘𝑝(1+𝜋+𝑣𝑡)1−𝑘𝑝
)
𝜃−1
] 
[
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
]
1+
𝜃α
1−α
𝐵𝑡 = 
η
η − 1
𝐴𝑡 
[
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
]
𝜃−1
= (1 − η) + η[(1 + 𝜋𝑡−1)
𝑘𝑝(1 + 𝜋 + 𝑣𝑡)
1−𝑘𝑝]
1−𝜃
[(1 + 𝜋𝑡)
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
]
𝜃−1
 
The real marginal cost (labor demand): 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 
𝑤𝑡
𝑓𝑛(𝑖)
. 
𝑓?̅?𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑧𝑡(1 − 𝛼)?̅?𝑡
−𝛼 
The Price Dispersion indicator and overall resources constraint: 
𝑃𝐷𝑡 = (1 − η) (
𝑃𝑡(𝑖)
𝑃𝑡
)
1−𝜃
+ η[(1 + 𝑖𝑑𝑥𝑡)]
1−𝜃𝑃𝐷(𝑡−1) 
𝑃𝐷𝑡𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 + ℎ(𝑐𝑡 ,𝑚𝑡). 
Aggregate Output: 
𝑦𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑒
𝑧𝑡 𝑛𝑡
1−𝛼(𝑖) 
The household optimal choices of consumption and labor supply[1]: 
(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1)
−𝜎
(1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡)(1 + 𝑟𝑡)
= 𝛽 
𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1 − ℎ𝑐𝑡)
1 + 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑡+1
 
𝑤𝑡 = 
𝜓𝑛𝑡
𝛼(1 + ℎ𝑐𝑡)
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1)−𝜎
 
Real interest rate, through the Fisher relationship (1 equation)  
                                                 
[1] Recall capital accumulation is not considered in the model.    
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1 + 𝑟𝑡 = 
1 + 𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
 
Taylor-type monetary Rule for monetary policy (1 equation) 
1 + 𝑅𝑡 = ((1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
1−𝜇𝜋)
1−𝜇𝑅(1 + 𝑅𝑡−1)
𝜇𝜋(1 + 𝜋𝑡)
(1−𝜇𝑅)𝜇𝜋(1 + 𝑦?̃?)
(1−𝜇𝑅)𝜇𝑦𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑅
 
Money demand, transaction costs function and marginal transaction cost of consumption: 
𝑅𝑡
1 + 𝑅𝑡
= 𝑎1𝑎
2 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
1+𝑎2
 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑐𝑡 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
𝑎2
 
ℎ𝑐𝑡 = 
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑡
= 𝑎1 (1 + 𝑎2) (
𝑐𝑡
𝑚𝑡
)
𝑎2
 
The natural-rate block:  
 
𝑤𝑡̅̅ ̅̂ =  
(1 + ℎ𝑐?̅?)
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐?̅? − ℎ𝑐?̅?−1)−𝜎
ψt(𝑛𝑡̅̅̅)
𝛾  
?̅?𝑡 = 
𝜓?̅?𝑡
𝛼(1 + ℎ𝑐?̅?)
𝑒𝑏𝑡(𝑐?̅? − ℎ𝑐?̅?−1)−𝜎
 
?̅?𝑡 = 𝑐?̅? + 𝑒
𝑥𝑡𝑔 + ℎ̅𝑡 
?̅?𝑡(𝑖)  =  𝑒
𝑧𝑡 ?̅?𝑡
1−𝛼(𝑖) 
?̅?𝑡
1 + ?̅?𝑡
= 𝑎1𝑎2 (
𝑐?̅?
?̅?𝑡
)
1+𝑎2
 
ℎ̅ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑐?̅? (
𝑐?̅?
?̅?𝑡
)
𝑎2
 
1 + ?̅?𝑡 = 
1 + ?̅?𝑡
1 + 𝐸𝑡?̅?𝑡+1
 
1 + ?̅?𝑡 = ((1 + ?̅?)(1 + ?̅?)
1−𝜇𝜋)
1−𝜇𝑅(1 + ?̅?𝑡−1)
𝜇𝜋(1 + ?̅?𝑡)
(1−𝜇𝑅)𝜇𝜋(1
+ 𝑦?̃?)
(1−𝜇𝑅)𝜇𝑦𝑒𝜀𝑡
𝑅
 
The output gap: 
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𝑦?̃? = 
𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡̅̅̅
− 1 
Output growth and money growth: 
𝑑𝑦𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡−1
− 1 
1 + 𝑔𝑀𝑡 = (
𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡−1
) (1 + 𝜋), 
where 𝑚𝑡 =
𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 and  𝑔𝑀𝑡 =
𝑀𝑡
𝑀𝑡−1
− 1. 
AR(1) Exogenous processes (white-noise innovations) 
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑧 
𝑣𝑡 = 𝜌𝑣𝑣𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑣 
𝜒𝑡 = 𝜌𝜒𝜒𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝜒
 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝜌𝑏𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑏 
 
4. CALIBRATION  
The calibration given to the parameters of the model relies on already available empirical 
works that similarly study the effect of monetary shocks. Some of the authors referenced 
and used as basis are: Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(1996, 1998), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Casares (2007), and specially, Smets and 
Wouters (2007). For the parameters included in our model, we use a calibration that is 
generally accepted among these authors and proven to be effective.  
The household’s utility function included in the model comprises several parameters that we 
calibrate as follows: the household discount factor is  𝛽 = 0.995, which implies a 2% real 
interest rate in steady state. We set the consumption habit term at ℎ = 0.7, as it brings 
moderate inertia of consumption dynamics consistent with consumption fluctuations 
(autocorrelation of consumption at 0.96 in model simulations). The following two 
parameters are calibrated following the posterior estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007), 
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where they conduct a Bayesian estimation of a DSGE model using US data. The risk aversion 
coefficient takes a value  𝜎 =1.38, and that of the inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity 
takes a value  𝛾 =1.83, following their findings. Finally, the weight of labor disutility is given 
a value Ψ = 4.5425. The criterion for the calibration is that this value enables to normalize 
labor at 𝑛=1 in steady state.  
The transaction cost function in our model includes three parameters, that we calibrate as 
follows: the constant term of the transaction’s technology is 𝑎0 =0.01, as it gives a realistic 
size of transaction costs over GDP, ℎ/𝑦 = 0.0107 (1.07%). The term 𝑎1 captures the weight 
of variable term of transactions technology. Assigning a value  𝑎1=0.02 enables to obtain a 
realistic steady-state share of real money over GDP, 𝑚/𝑦=0.94 (94%). Finally, the 
transaction cost elasticity on c/m ratio term is calibrated to match relative volatility of 
nominal money growth with respect to real GDP growth (in order to replicate 
std(gM)/std(dy) = 3, as observed in US data). We get this when  𝑎2=15.  
In the production function, the Cobb-Douglas capital share is calibrated at  𝛼 =0.36, which 
is a standard value in RBC literature (Cooley and Hansen, 1999). As previously explained 
along the paper, prices are sticky, and follow Calvo (1983) specification. Each period, only a 
share of the firms gets to adjust their prices, which is described by the Calvo probability for 
sticky prices. Setting Calvo probability at η = 0.75 implies that, on average, firms set the 
optimal price every 4 periods (quarters), once per year (Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000). 
Moreover, the ratio of government purchases to output in steady state is set at 𝑔/𝑦= 0.25, 
since 25% is a reasonable rate for a model without investment.  
The Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity takes a value 𝜃 = 10, which leads to obtaining a markup in steady-
state at 11.1%. As for the coefficients in the inflation equation, we give the parameters 
involved the following calibration: 𝑘𝑝=0.5, which stands for the price indexation on lagged 
inflation, as it is evenly weighted between lagged inflation and steady state inflation. 
Moreover, it gives a reasonable autocorrelation of inflation in model simulations (0.79). The 
next term is set at  𝜇𝜋 = 1.5, since it is the Taylor (1993) rule original coefficient of inflation. 
Similarly, 𝜇𝑦 =0.5/4, as it is the Taylor (1993) rule original coefficient on the output gap. The 
next parameter is  𝜇𝑅 = 0.8, which represents the Taylor Rule coefficient on interest-rate 
smoothing. It gives a reasonable inertial behavior of central banks as well as an 
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autocorrelation of the nominal interest rate at 0.90. Finally, in order to obtain a steady state 
value of inflation at 2% annualized, 𝜋 =0.005.  
The last parameters in our model correspond to the different shocks. The persistence of the 
technology shock is given a value 𝜌𝑧 = 0.9. Meanwhile, the persistence of the price-push 
shock is calibrated at 𝜌𝑣 = 0.5; the persistence of consumption preference shock takes a 
value 𝜌𝑏 = 0.8, and the persistence of fiscal shock is set at 𝜌𝜒 = 0.8. the selection of numerical 
values for the model parameters brings a fair match of model-generated data and actual US 
data on the relative volatility (represented by the standard deviations) and persistence 
(coefficient of autocorrelation) of dy,  𝜋, R and gM observed in quarterly US data 1993-2018 
model (see Table 1 below).  
Table 1- Second-moment statistics. Model vs data. 
 
The following table summarizes the calibration of all the model parameters. 
Table 2- Parameter Assigned Values and Definition 
Parameter Std Deviation 
Model     Data 
Autocorrelation 
Model       Data  
Output growht, 𝑑𝑦 0.6217    0.5842     0.3001    0.3699 
Inflation, 𝜋 0.4721    0.2085  0.7929    0.4564 
Nominal Interest Rate, 𝑅 0.5315    0.6995 0.8973    0.9851 
Nominal Money growth, 𝑔𝑀 1.6929    1.5860 0.1141    0.6847 
Parameter Value Definition 
𝛽 0.995 Household discount factor.  
ℎ 0.7 Consumption habits.  
𝜎 1.38 Risk aversion coefficient.  
𝛾 1.83 Inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity 
Ψ 4.5425 Weight of labor disutility 
𝜃 10 Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity.  
𝛼 0.36 Cobb-Douglas capital share.  
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5. MONETARY POLICY ANALYSIS  
As mentioned in previous sections, this paper examines the stabilizing performance of two 
different monetary policy rules. The model does not try to represent any particular economy; 
it can just be thought as a representation of the empirical fluctuations of today’s modern 
economies. The first monetary policy is the Taylor (1993) rule on the nominal interest rate. 
Taylor (1993) estimated a linear policy rule for the US that included adjustments of the short-
term interest rate of the Federal Reserve that follows deviations of current inflation from a 
specified target rate and output deviations with respect to its trend. 
Alternatively, the central bank can choose to modify the quantity of money in circulation 
(thus, the money supply) or the interest rates in the market, which can be accommodated in 
a (nominal) money growth monetary policy rule. 
Our analysis aims at determining which of the two monetary policies is best for the economy. 
There are different ways in which this could be evaluated, but following existing literature, 
we will use a welfare-based evaluation method (Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and 
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)). This approach permits to isolate the effects of a monetary 
η 0.75 Calvo probability for sticky prices.                 
𝑘𝑝 0.5 Price indexation on lagged inflation. 
𝜇𝜋 1.5 Taylor (1993) Rule original coefficient on inflation.  
𝜇𝑦 0.5/4 Taylor (1993) Rule coefficient on the output gap.  
𝜇𝑅 0.8 Taylor (1993) Rule coefficient on interest-rate smoothing 
𝜋 0.005 Steady state inflation at 2% annualized 
g/y 0.25 Ratio of government purchases to output in steady state 
𝑎0 0.01 Constant term of transactions technology.  
𝑎1 0.02 Weight of variable term of transactions technology.  
𝑎2 15 Transaction cost elasticity on c/m ratio.  
𝜌𝑧 0.9 Persistence of Technology shock.            
𝜌𝑣 0.5 Persistence of price-push shock. 
𝜌𝑏 0.8 Persistence of consumption preference shock. 
𝜌𝜒 0.8 Persistence of fiscal shock. 
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policy in terms of the welfare of the private agents in the economy, thus, the households. 
This, we believe, is important because the central bank acts as a social planner in the benefit 
of the households. In our model, the best approximation to households’ welfare is their 
utility function. Thus, we are able to measure the effectiveness of both monetary policies by 
analyzing their impact on households’ intertemporal utility.  
Since the steady state value of household welfare under both monetary policy rules is the 
same, we need to conduct second-order approximations of the utility function. In order to 
achieve this, we use the Taylor series expansion. Therefore, we not only approximate the 
households’ utility by adding the first-order derivative to the steady state value (which 
represents what the welfare would be like if all shocks were inexistent, thus, 0). Consumers 
seek smoothing in the long run, which applies to consumption, labor hours supplied, etc. 
Thus, what we aim to obtain is a low variance of the expected households’ welfare, which 
we evaluate through the second-order approximation.  
The Instantaneous Utility Function (IUF), that is, the household’s utility in the current 
period, is composed of two parts: the instantaneous utility of consumption (that we refer to 
as 𝑢𝑡
𝑐) and the instantaneous disutility of labor (denoted as 𝑢𝑡
𝑛). Other important elements 
that we need to pre-define are the habit-adjusted consumption, which is represented by 
𝑐ℎ𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 − ℎ𝑐𝑡−1, and the unit-mean consumption preference shock, 𝑏ℎ𝑡 = 𝑒
𝑏𝑡 . 
The IUF can be transformed as follows: we first take the second-order approximation for 
𝑢𝑡
𝑐 and 𝑢𝑡
𝑛 and obtain: 
𝑢𝑡
𝑐 ≅
𝑐ℎ1−𝜎
1−𝜎
+ 𝑐ℎ−𝜎(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ) +
𝑐ℎ1−𝜎
1−𝜎
(𝑏ℎ𝑡 − 𝑏ℎ) −
𝜎𝑐ℎ−𝜎−1
2
(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ)
2 +
𝑐ℎ−𝜎(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ)(𝑏ℎ𝑡 − 𝑏ℎ)  and 
𝑢𝑡
𝑛 ≅  Ψ
𝑛1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ Ψn𝛾(𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛) + Ψ𝛾𝑛
𝛾−1(𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛)
2 
Welfare, in fact, not only entails households’ utility at a particular moment in time (say period 
t), but also considers the present value of expected future utility. Thus, taking the 
unconditional expectation of household intertemporal utility (welfare), we get: 
𝐸[𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑡] = (𝑢𝑡
𝑐 − 𝑢𝑡
𝑛) + 𝐸𝑡(𝑢𝑡+1
𝑐 − 𝑢𝑡+1
𝑛 ) + 𝛽2𝐸𝑡(𝑢𝑡+2
𝑐 − 𝑢𝑡+2
𝑛 ) + ⋯ 
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which coincides with 𝐸[𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑡] = (1 + 𝛽 + 𝛽
2 + ⋯)[𝑢𝑐 − 𝑢𝑛]. Put another way, 
𝐸[𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑡] = (
1
1 − 𝛽
) [𝑢𝑐 − 𝑢𝑛]. 
Therefore, we can compute the unconditional expectation of household intertemporal utility 
(that we call welfare) as: 
𝐸[𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑡] = (
1
1 − 𝛽
) [
𝑐ℎ1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
−
𝜎𝑐ℎ−𝜎−1
2
𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑐ℎ) + 𝑐ℎ−𝜎𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝑐ℎ, 𝑏ℎ) − Ψ
𝑛1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
− Ψ𝛾𝑛𝛾−1𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝑛)] 
where VAR stands for variance and COV refers to the covariance. We include these three 
relevant equations in our model, which allows us to complete the entire model comprised 
of 36 equations and 36 endogenous variables.  
𝑢𝑡
𝑐 ≅
𝑐ℎ1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
+ 𝑐ℎ−𝜎(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ) +
𝑐ℎ1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
(𝑏ℎ𝑡 − 𝑏ℎ) −
𝜎𝑐ℎ−𝜎−1
2
(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ)
2
+ 𝑐ℎ−𝜎(𝑐ℎ𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ)(𝑏ℎ𝑡 − 𝑏ℎ) 
𝑢𝑡
𝑛 ≅  Ψ
𝑛1+𝛾
1 + 𝛾
+ Ψn𝛾(𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛) + Ψ𝛾𝑛
𝛾−1(𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛)
2 
𝐸[𝑊𝑒𝑙] = (
1
1 − 𝛽
) [𝑢𝑡
𝑐 − 𝑢𝑡
𝑛] 
 
5.1 Baseline Model. 
The first model we are going to analyze serves as our baseline for monetary policy evaluation. 
The baseline model is obtained by using a Taylor-type monetary policy and giving a value 1.5 
to 𝜇𝜋, which stands for the Taylor (1993) original coefficient on inflation. The results 
obtained will be contrasted with those obtained by applying the two different monetary 
policies (Taylor-rule and (nominal) money growth rule with the optimized coefficient 𝜇𝜋), in 
order to evaluate which of them improves overall households’ social welfare. Under this 
baseline model, the 2nd order approximation of the unconditional expected welfare value is -
13.776.  
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Table 3 – Baseline Model - Stabilizing performance 
𝜇𝜋 std(c) std(c-hc(-1)) std(n) 𝑢
𝑐 𝑢𝑛 .01*Mean(W) .01*E[Welfare] std(R) std(gM) 
1.50 1.8516 0.6944 2.7785 -2.757 65.779 -1.26 -13.7757 0.5315 1.6929 
 
The values presented correspond to the Taylor (1993) rule coefficient on inflation, 𝜇𝜋, the 
standard deviation of consumption, std(c), the standard deviation of the habits-adjusted 
consumption std(c-hc(-1)), the standard deviation of labor, std(n), the unconditional 
expectation of the instantaneous utility of consumption (𝑢𝑐) the unconditional expectation 
of the instantaneous disutility of labor (𝑢𝑛), one hundredth of the average welfare 
0.01*Mean(W), one hundredth of the expected social welfare, 0.01*E[Welfare], and the 
standard deviations of both nominal interest rate, std(R) and nominal money growth, 
std(gM). Under the baseline calibration, with 𝜀𝑅=0.2^2 and 𝜇𝜋 = 1.5, the expected welfare 
provided is -13.7757. 
 
5.2. Taylor-Rule Monetary Policy. 
In order to evaluate the Taylor-type monetary policy, we first need to adjust the model so 
that it meets several specifications. The methodology employed is the following: other things 
being equal, we vary the value of 𝜇𝜋 in order to see which value of this variable leads to the 
optimal social utility welfare. In this case, the variance of 𝜀𝑅=0.002^2. Once we vary the 
value of  𝜇𝜋 we see that the one leading to the highest (least negative) expected social welfare 
is  𝜇𝜋 = 4. Other things being equal, this value enables the central bank to obtain an expected 
social welfare equal to 𝐸[𝑊𝑒𝑙] =  −12.61124626.  
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Table 4- Taylor-Rule Monetary Policy - Stabilizing Performance 
𝜇𝜋 std(c) std(c-hc(-1)) std(n) 𝑢
𝑐 𝑢𝑛 .01*Mean(W) .01*E[Wel] std(R) std(gM) 
1.25 1.8330 0.6918 2.8854 -4.6635 1.612 -12.6005 -12.6139 0.5275 1.6751 
1.50 1.8516 0.6944 2.7785 -4.6636 1.611 -12.6005 -12.6130 0.5315 1.6929 
1.75 1.8681 0.6978 2.7042 
 
-4.6636 1.611 -12.6005 -12.6124 
 
0.5391 
 
1.7200 
 
2 1.8833 
 
0.7019 2.6499 -4.6637 1.611 -12.6005 -12.6121 
 
0.5486 1.7532 
2.50 1.911 0.7107 2.5774 
 
-4.6638 1.610 -12.6005 -12.6116 
 
0.57 1.8308 
3.50 1.9588 0.7292 2.5052 -4.6639 1.610 -12.6005 -12.61127563 
 
0.6155 
 
2.0079 
4 1.9798 0.7383 2.4874 -4.6640 1.610 -12.6005 -12.61124626 
 
0.6381 
 
2.1008 
4.25 1.9898 
 
0.7428 
 
2.4813 
 
-4.6640 1.610 -12.6005 -12.61125007 
 
0.6492 
 
2.1477 
 
4.50 1.9994 
 
0.7471 2.4764 
 
-4.6640 1.610 -12.6005 -12.6113 
 
0.6602 2.1947 
 
6 0.0205 0.0077 0.0247 -4.6642 1.610 -12.6005 -12.6115 
 
0.7234 
 
2.4747 
 
8 0.0211 0.0080 0.0248 -4.6643 1.610 -12.6005 -12.6119 
 
0.8002 
 
2.8344 
 
10 0.0215 0.0083 0.0250 -4.6645 1.610 -12.6005 -12.6123 
 
0.8697 3.1745 
 
 
5.3. (Nominal) Money Growth Monetary Policy. 
We now need to recalibrate the model in order to fit it to the new monetary policy we are 
going to apply, the (nominal) money growth policy. We achieve this by finding the value of 
the monetary shock (variance of 𝜀𝑅) that leads to obtaining dy = 0.62. This way, we ensure 
all other variables take the same value as under the Taylor-rule monetary policy, so the 
analysis of 𝜇𝜋can take place. The value we found to meet this requirement is 𝜀
𝑅=0.0075^2. 
Similarly, we closely examined the values of 𝜇𝜋 that would exhibit highest welfare among 
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households. In this case, under a (nominal) money growth monetary policy, the greatest 
expected welfare (𝐸[𝑊𝑒𝑙] = −12.613062) is obtained with a value 𝜇𝜋 = 11.  
 
Table 5- Money growth monetary policy - Stabilizing Performance 
𝜇𝜋 std(c) std(c-hc(-1)) std(n) 𝑢
𝑐 𝑢𝑛 .01*Mean(W) .01*E[Wel] std(R) std(gM) 
1.25 1.9496 
 
0.7179 
 
3.0720 
 
-4.6640 1.6129 -1.26 -12.6167 
 
0.2851 
 
0.9711 
 
1.5 1.9393 
 
0.7123 
 
3.0238 
 
-4.6640 1.6127 -1.26 -12.6162 
 
0.2963 
 
0.9628 
 
2 1.9280 
 
0.7054 
 
2.9485 
 
-4.6640 1.6123 -1.26 -12.6154 
 
0.3171 
 
0.9572 
 
3.5 1.9279 
 
0.7011 
 
2.8154 
 
-4.6640 1.6117 -1.26 -12.6141 
 
0.3664 
 
0.9840 
 
4 1.9327 
 
0.7021 
 
2.7880 
 
-4.6640 1.6116 -1.26 -12.6139 
 
0.3798 
 
1.0001 
 
6 1.9585 
 
0.7107 
 
2.7185 
 
-4.6640 1.6113 -1.26 -12.6133 
 
0.4249 
 
1.0786 
 
8 1.9865 
 
0.7216 
 
2.6833 
 
-4.6641 1.6111 -1.26 -12.6131 
 
0.4619 
 
1.1667 
 
10 2.0133 
 
0.7328 
 
2.6647 
 
-4.6641 1.6110 -1.26 -12.613064 
 
0.4944 
 
1.2572 
 
11 2.0259 
 
0.7383 
 
2.6591 
 
-4.6642 1.6110 -1.26 -12.613062 
 
0.5095 
 
1.3024 
 
11.5 2.0320 
 
0.7409 
 
2.6570 
 
-4.6642 1.6110 -1.26 -12.613067 
 
0.5167 
 
1.3249 
 
12 2.0380 
 
0.7436 
 
2.6553 
 
-4.6642 1.6110 -1.26 -12.6131 
 
0.5239 
 
1.3473 
 
 
5.4. Optimized interest rate rule vs. optimized money growth rule.  
When aiming to compare the two of them, we can first compare the expected social welfare 
that each monetary policy provides and observe that the optimized Tylor-type monetary 
policy leads to higher (less negative) welfare than the optimized money growth monetary 
policy. This first evaluation, thus, leads to favoring a Taylor-type monetary policy 
(𝐸[𝑊𝑒𝑙] = −12.61124626) against the money growth monetary policy (𝐸[𝑊𝑒𝑙] =
−12.613062). A different way to compare both monetary policies would entail evaluating 
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their performance with respect to other indicators. Tables 4 and 5 gather the data used to 
construct table 6, which includes 6 graphs that depict the volatility of several variables of our 
interest.  
Table 6- Taylor rule vs. Money growth rule
 
Source: MATLAB output 
It is a known fact that lower volatility of consumption and labor hours will be preferred by 
individuals. This is true because households, as well as firms, seek stability. Thus, our next 
analysis focuses on evaluating which of the policies leads to obtaining lower volatilities. 
Taking into consideration the optimized values for both monetary policies,  𝜇𝜋 = 4 for the 
Taylor-rule and 𝜇𝜋 = 11 for the money growth rule, we observe that consumption volatility 
is lower under the first scenario (Taylor-type monetary policy), as it lies below 2, whereas 
that volatility under a money growth monetary policy takes a value greater than 2 (Graph 2). 
If we now look at the habit-adjusted consumption volatility, both policies lead to the same 
value (0.7383) (Graph 3). The next variable under discussion is the labor hours volatility 
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(Graph 4). While both values are relatively close to each other, the Taylor-type monetary 
policy yields a lower value (2.4874)  than that provided by the money growth policy (2.6591).  
Therefore, our initial conclusion that the Taylor-type monetary policy outperforms the 
money growth monetary policy is aligned with the second part of the evaluation.  
Finally, we can evaluate both policies in connection with the volatility of the monetary policy 
instruments, thus, 𝑅 and 𝑔𝑀. The values that these policies exhibit can be found in tables 4 
and 5. The results obtained indicate that both standard deviations (volatilities) are lower 
under the optimized money growth monetary policy (0.5095 and 1.3024) than under the 
optimized interest rate rule (0.6381 and 2.1008). Put another way, in terms of monetary policy 
instruments, 𝑅 and 𝑔𝑀, the money growth policy provides higher stability in the fluctuations 
of such variables than the Taylor rule. However, it is of great importance to note that these 
instrumental volatilities do not affect households’ welfare, since 𝑅 and 𝑔𝑀 do not appear in 
the inter-temporal utility function and its second-order approximation.  
6. CONCLUSIONS. 
As already mentioned along the paper, the aim of this study is to discuss the convenience of 
using two alternative representations of monetary policy: a conventional rule based on the 
nominal interest rate and an unconventional monetary policy that takes the rate of money 
growth as the policy instrument. In the former case, monetary policy is of the Taylor type, 
which represents the relationship between interest rate and expected inflation. In the second, 
monetary policy is represented as a given growth rate of money supply, that we referred to 
as (nominal) money growth monetary policy. We do so by using a simple general equilibrium 
monetary model which entails sticky prices. 
The analysis is based on a calibrated New Keynesian model with money featuring a 
transaction cost technology, sticky prices a la Calvo (1983) and a monopolistically 
competitive industry. The model consists of households, firms, the government and the 
central bank, each of them trying to maximize their objective functions subject to their 
budget constraints, being the overall objective that of maximizing households’ welfare. In 
addition, we conduct an exercise of calibrating the model parameters, which demonstrates 
consistency with empirical evidence and complies with the desired variable outcomes. 
Moreover, the methodology applied in this paper appears to be appropriate, since it entails 
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an analysis of the performance of two monetary policy regimes, where we evaluate social 
welfare from the expected household intertemporal utility. We seek for the optimized 
coefficient on the response of the policy instrument to inflation deviations and compare the 
results between the policy rules as well as with the baseline calibration.  
The following table depicts optimized coefficients of the three possible scenarios, being the 
first one the baseline calibrated New Keynesian model with a Taylor-rule monetary policy 
(and a coefficient on inflation 𝜇𝜋=1.5); the second one is the optimized Taylor (1993) rule 
(where  𝜇𝜋=4) and the third one is the optimized money growth rule (where 𝜇𝜋=11).  
Table 7 – Baseline model vs. Optimized Taylor rule vs. Optimized money growth rule 
𝜇𝜋 Std(c) std(c-hc(-1)) std(n) 𝑢
𝑐 𝑢𝑛 .001*Mean(W) .001*E[Welfare] std(R) std(gM) 
1.5 1.8516 0.6944 2.7785 -2.7569 65.779 -1.26 -13.7757 0.5315 1.6929 
4 1.9798 0.7383 2.4874 -4.6640 1.610 -12.6005 -12.61124626 
 
0.6381 
 
2.1008 
11 2.0259 0.7383 2.6591 -4.6642 1.611 -12.6005 -12.613062 0.5095 1.3024 
The evaluation method used consists on comparing the expected social welfare provided by 
the three regimes, in order to analyze which of the three leads to obtaining the best social 
outcome. Therefore, as exhibited in the table, we can conclude that implementing a Taylor-
rule monetary policy leads to achieving the highest social welfare. This is possible when the 
Taylor (1993) coefficient on inflation takes the optimized value ( 𝜇𝜋=4). 
Furthermore, the interest rate rule outperforms the money growth rule in terms of 
consumption and labor hours stability. Since these variables are included  in the utility 
function, and thus, in the second-order approximation, we want to minimize their volatility, 
allowing households to gain stability. Consider the fact that households, as well as firms, seek 
stability. 
Finally, we evaluate the effect of both monetary policy regimes with respect to the policy 
instruments volatility (nominal interest rate, 𝑅 and nominal money growth, 𝑔𝑀). In this case, 
the money growth rule leads to lower  monetary instrument volatilities than the interest rate 
rule. However, these variables do not directly affect the households’ welfare, and thus, do 
not constitute a central factor  in the analysis of the two representations of monetary policy. 
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In conclusion, our estimates show that the optimized Taylor rule (with a coefficient on 
inflation equal to 4) benefits households the most, since it provides them with the highest 
welfare as well as lower consumption and labor hours volatility than the money growth 
monetary policy. 
Moreover, our  results are in line with existing literature. Woodford (2001) concluded that 
the Taylor rule incorporates several features of an optimal monetary policy, from the 
perspective of at least one simple class of optimizing models. Our findings, based on a simple 
optimizing model, lead to the same conclusions. However, just as stated by Erceg, 
Henderson and Levin (2000), the monetary policy implemented does not enable households 
to achieve the Pareto-optimal equilibrium that would occur under completely flexible wages 
and prices; Put another way, the model presents a tradeoff in lowering the volatility of the 
output gap, nominal interest rates, nominal money growth and price inflation 
The most relevant limitation of this paper is that the model is very simple. Further extensions 
considering endogenous capital accumulation, sticky wages and financial frictions, among 
others, could be implemented in order to better give an estimation of the true model. While 
further research is needed, the main point is that the stabilizing performance of the optimized 
Taylor-rule monetary policy regime appears to outperform the optimized monetary policy 
that takes the rate of money growth as the policy instrument. This is true for a welfare-based 
evaluation method, which aims at enhancing households’ intertemporal utility, as well as 
consumption and labor hours stability. 
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